In 1826, Sultan Mahmud II orchestrated the slaughter of 6,000-7,0 in order to incinerate any janissary remnants that had taken refug Belgrade Forest outside Istanbul.' During his reign (1808-39), t many of the other bases of the ancien regime, such as the timar sy tax farms, and the political autonomy of provincial notables. He a pious foundations, brought them under a special ministry, and ex revenues. Such stories of Sultan Mahmud's dramatic and violent p their 18th-century origins and their 19th-century legacies, are fam man and Middle Eastern history. It is a commonplace that Sultan dismantle the power of the military and religious classes in favor cracy of administrators and scribes. And it is also known that his e impact on the subsequent evolution of the Tanzimat reform progra 19th century.2
This article retells these renowned histories of transformation, el tralization, and state building in a new way, through the prism of attire that the state required its servants and subjects to wear. N cratic reform, fiscal centralization, and military action, clothing r on an 1829 law-were powerful royal tools in Sultan Mahmud's eff reshape state and society. The 1829 law specified the clothing worn by the varying ranks of civil and religious officials. It sough community and occupational signs of differentiation by dress wi status marker-the fez-that placed the state at the center of Ottom remaining arbiter of identity.3 The law, in short, was a quite radic tempt to eliminate clothing distinctions that long had separated th subject classes and the various Ottoman religious communities fro Focusing on clothing legislation not only narrates the familiar st ernization in a novel way. It also illuminates the less-well-known that the sultan's policies encountered. The familiar part concerns on elite rivals: many of the targeted institutions and groups had stones of an administration that had undergone substantial transfo century. This old order consisted of Istanbul-based officials and p who together enjoyed formidable political, fiscal, economic, and social pr neglected aspect concerns the Ottoman popular classes and their role life, for Mahmud's clothing laws sought to demolish not only the elite bu popular sources of opposition to the consolidation of his personal pow among the latter were urban workers and their guilds, whose politica influence, in alliance with the janissaries, was greater in the 18th century been since perhaps the dawn of Ottoman rule, back in the 13th and 14th So when Mahmud eradicated the janissaries in 1826, he immediately move Ottoman workers and their associations, exiling thousands of migrant port laborers-ethnic Turks and Kurds-to their provincial places of origin.
For more than two millennia, rulers and governments across the globe pr clothing laws in order to modulate gender, communal, political, and socia within and among their administrative, military, and subject classes.6 Fo the history of the Roman republic and empire is studded with such laws, one that forbade the toga for Roman citizens sentenced to banishment, t ing the mark that distinguished them from the barbarians.7 In what becam and Central Europe, there is a continuous tradition of governmental sart ilance from Charlemagne until the late 18th century.8 There was a "b clothing regulations in the late 12th and early 13th centuries, attempting certain distinctive things for the nobility."9 In 13th-century Burgundy, f the points on the shoes of commoners could reach only six inches, but th could be 24 inches."' During the 14th and 15th centuries, such regulation each year" in the areas of modern-day France, England, Spain, and the Low Countries.1 If the trains of their gowns were too long, Venetian women of the early 15th century could lose their souls through papal excommunication.'2 In colonial Virginia and Massachusetts as well as in many European countries, the torrent of laws in the late 16th century became "a positive flood" in the following century.13
In 18th-century Europe, contemporaries said, "money rules . . . [and] comfortable artisans and rich merchants rise above their estate."'14 In Paris (and elsewhere in Eu rope and in the American colonies), an emerging bourgeoisie offered its final challenge to the aristocracy for economic and political power. The emerging classes of Europe and America adopted increasingly luxurious lifestyles-ranging from clothing to horse harnesses to express their new wealth and their social aspirations. In this accelerating world of fashion, the aristocracy, pressed to affirm its social dom inance, had become entrapped in fashion wars that the bourgeoisie could best affor For a time, in places such as France, monarchies propped up their embattled aristocratic allies with clothing laws, limiting the use of furs and other luxury items and demanding severe and plain dress of the bourgeoisie.15
The significance of clothing legislation is not always self-evident. On the one hand, the laws frequently may reflect actual changes in fashion. On the other hand the relationship of laws (clothing and otherwise) to behavior often is more complicated. Promulgation or reiteration of a law may not always mean an increase in violations. Other factors besides sartorial threats to stability triggered clothing-law enactments.
At the broadest level, European historians have understood the clothing laws as "instruments of political, social, and economic regulation."16 Others have emphasized the economic or moral concerns of premodern governments, or a combination of the desire to restrain extravagance on the one hand and uphold morality on the other.17 One historian of European clothing laws has argued that clothing laws actually were not seeking to prevent extravagance and preserve morality-although the laws themselves avowed these goals. In fact, they were nothing less than a "concerted attempt to impose a visible hierarchy on shifting, flexible, and overlapping social groups."'8 By about 1400, in this argument, status based on birth had given way to more acquirable and visible markers, such as houses, furnishings, and apparel, increasing the need for regulation of these material social signifiers.19 The interpretive differences among these scholars seems mainly a matter of emphasis rather than substance, because there is a general agreement that the goal of the regulations was to ensure that "distinctions in rank should continue to be visible in dress."20
Aristocratic dress openly performed a sociopolitical function-self-affirmation for some and subordination for the others-freezing everyone in their places by signaling the place of everyone.2 1 By the end of the 18th century, however, clothing laws were a spent force in Western Europe, although they remained on the books in places such as France, the American colonies, and the German lands until as late as the 1780s.22 Their disappearance is tied to the mounting abundance of consumer goods that made it possible for the "middling" ranks to obtain the goods and thus blur the status marker of the elites. In response, elites adopted negative strategies of discretion and understatement. They abandoned the consumption of the elaborate and excessive that the bourgeoisie could better afford and pursued the more difficult to acquire refinement of taste and discrimination. Turning from an aesthetic of opulence to one of austerit and subtlety, they embraced the luxury of leisure time to absorb the mounting intri cacies of taste, grace, and fashion.23
In the Ottoman world, similarly, there were deep roots to the tradition of clothing laws-extending to the beginning of the empire-that Sultan Mahmud was drawin upon. Ottoman clothing laws, moreover, gave a particular emphasis to head coverings that, until 1829, endured as the most characteristic manner of officially desig nating honor and rank. For example, turbans played a key role in mid-18th-century rituals surrounding the Ottoman coronation ceremonies-the sword-girding at th Eyiip mosque in Istanbul. In the procession, two horsemen each carried turbans of the monarch, tilting them to the right and to the left to receive the homage of th accompanying janissaries. As in many other areas of Ottoman life, Sultan Suleyman the Lawgiver codified-more rigorously than ever specifying both headgear and dre ulations concerning the attire of the Ottoman civil and military hierarch a kind of turban unique to himself, while viziers and other important of types particular to their rank. The ulema wore special headgear, while imp and janissary officers had their own. Rank-and-file janissaries wore anoth head covering, while the "ordinary classes" bore yet other types, such as turban. An early-18th-century source reported that essentially the same lations promulgated by the Lawgiver in the late 16th century remained o to his own day.27 This lack of change in the clothing laws may be significant. Historians pean clothing laws have noticed a strong correlation between fashion cha the permeability of the social structure. If they are right, then the many at recorded in the era between the founding of the empire and the reig Suleyman indicate a real social mobility.28 Subsequently, there is a relativ in the sources consulted, of clothing legislation between the late 16th cent early decades of the 18th century. Although this may indicate social rigidi sence of laws might be only apparent, and the subject awaits further res certainly, as will be seen later, the volume of legislation is considerable f 1720 until the end of Sultan Mahmud II's reign, suggesting a period of soci
The regulations for official dress clearly were complex. In an important of the Ottoman administrative apparatus, J. von Hammer raised the subjec ing laws for officials, emphasizing that he offered only an "overview" of t ulations. But this overview went on for some thirteen closely packed pages the attire prescribed for the various ranks and levels.29
The Ottoman state expected clothing laws to fulfill a host of functions; complexity is hardly astonishing. Although Ottoman rulers, in common w contemporaries in many regions of the world, used clothing laws for a hos nomic, social, moral, and political purposes, this study emphasizes their p mensions. Hence, the focus is on their nature as regulations to maintain and the most state control possible over functionaries and subjects. Clothin ranks within the official hierarchies, acknowledging and rewarding servi ruler. One glance at the robes informed all-rivals and allies alike-of the precise rank and place of an official. Clothing laws also reflected the expanding power of the state. It is no coincidence that they received a definitive form in the reign of Suleyman the Lawgiver, when the state regularized and deepened its control over it own servants as well as its rural and urban subjects. Sultan Suleyman's clothing regulations marked this growing penetration of the state into society just as surely as did his Kanun-t reaya, a legal code that dictated behavior in many arenas of his sub jects' lives, ranging from the level of workers' wages, to the use of gold and silver serving vessels, to the amount of gluten in flour, and fat in butter.30 Clothing laws n less than wage, price, weights, measures, and criminal regulations all were means of disciplining behavior.3'
Although clothing regulations originated in state requirements for control, they were not simply instruments of social discipline from above imposed on those below. Rather, the laws were instruments of negotiation, used by both the state and its elites This content downloaded from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11 Dec 2016 12:14:10 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms as well as by the various (occupational and religious) communal groups. The laws usefully demarcated community boundaries for the subject classes, immediately identifying insiders and outsiders. Clothing and headgear helped give status and a sense of identity to members of the specific religious, ethnic, and occupational communities in Ottoman society. Therefore, communities of Ottoman subjects-that is, the subordinate groups in society-often prompted the state to promulgate or enforce vestimentary regulations because, for them, clothing laws delineated, maintained, and reinforced gender, religious, and social distinctions. Those with power in gender, communal, or political relations, however, especially benefitted from the laws. In controlling the public dress (and behavior) of their own (and all) women, men had the power of the state behind them. In the arena of communal relations, regulated street attire daily sought to affirm the superiority of Muslims in Ottoman society. And headgear and clothing visibly reinforced the claims to privilege by members of the Ottoman political hierarchy vis-a-vis the subject classes.
CLOTHING LEGISLATION, 1720 LEGISLATION, -1808 The following section does not detail all of the known 18th-ce stead, it offers samples ranging across the period, from the 17 Further, it presents examples of clothing legislation that respe religious, and social distinctions.
During most of the long 18th century (1683-1808), the state military pressure and, in the second half of the period, suffer These were the days of military defeats, territorial withdraw traction (after ca. 1763). In such precarious political and ec the clothing laws sought to assure Ottoman subjects and elites still an orderly place in which all retained their respective po tions. They worked to reinforce the existing social markers, st over women, Muslims over non-Muslims, and elites over subje
The first example dates from the 1720s, when clothing laws the aftermath of the landmark 1699 Treatv of Karlowitz. aristocrats at Saadabad, the imperial pleasure complex of Sultan Ahme 30), vied with one another for prestige and power, using luxurious displa spicuous consumption as their weapons.36 The building of palaces, endless festivals, and extraordinary displays denote an intense competition over c tion within the court and among the notables for social position-status de from military derring-do or bureaucratic skills but, rather, from the sophi one's consumption, whether of tulips or parties. I believe that it is appropriate to consider that the shift to a theatre of l consumption applies not merely to the Tulip Period but to the entire 18th in Europe, Asia, and America, new groups in the Ottoman Empire were ch the economic, social, and political power of the royal families and aristoc this Ottoman transformation, the new social groups emerged from outside the state apparatus, thanks to quickening foreign trade and an increasing of goods. While many prospered from the European trade, the commerci the Indian-Iranian East also were important. Because of Ottoman particula of the new 18th-century merchants dealing with the West and some of th with Iran came from the Greek and Armenian communities, the so-called O minorities.38 This Ottoman merchant group also owed much to the "ravenous pattern sumption" seen at the Istanbul court.39 For a long time, the Ottoman court as a comparatively vast market for goods and services, necessities and luxu Lavish spectacles were common, such as the fifty-day fete for Sultan Murat III's (1574-95) son, on the occasion of his circumcision. Other examples include the prolonged wedding feasts of the daughter of Sultan Ibrahim (1640-48) and the cession extravaganza of Sultan Mehmet IV (1648-87).4? Subsequently abandoned (allegedly because they were too expensive), they were resumed with a vengeance during the early-18th-century Tulip Period-take, for example, the sixteen-day circumcision festival, celebrated in 1720 "with the greatest pomp ever," for the sons of Sultan Ahmet III.41 Supplying such opulence required merchants, some of whom prof ited mightily, and the rise of the 18th-century Ottoman merchant group certainly w given a powerful additional impetus by the splendors of the Tulip Period court.42
But it seems unlikely that the consumption competitions in Ottoman Istanbul during the Tulip Period are a salvo (as they were in contemporary Europe) in the notables' wars against the rise of the merchant group an aristocratic use of luxurious consumption to defend against the increasing wealth of the merchants. A rising bourgeoisie does not seem to have been present in sufficient numbers to explain the events of the Tulip Period.
Rather, the Tulip Period competitors emerged from within the state apparatus, and it is there that we must look in order to understand the consumption competition of the age. A transfer of power away from the sultan-to others in his court-already had occurred during the late 16th century, and another shift began at the mid-point of the 17th century. Political power now shifted away not only from the sultan but also from his court to bureaucrats. As this happened, the state less frequently imposed its will by sheer force or command. Instead, in a pattern that acquired increasing momentum during the 18th century, it adopted other stratagems to exercise influence. Among those who emerged in positions of political prominence in the This content downloaded from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11 Dec 2016 12:14:10 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 18th century were Istanbul officials who owned lifetime tax farms (malik/ane's) in the provinces. As early as 1694, the Istanbul regime inaugurated a fiscal system that exerted control over the provinces in a new way in Ottoman history, so indirect and subtle that, until recently, it was overlooked by analysts of the period.43 In the new system, central bureaucrats who also were holders (malikaneci's) of lifetime tax farms sublet some of them to provincial notables (ayans). This practice created ties of common financial interest that bound the local magnates to the capital and also made them prey to its political will. They expressed loyalty to the state by copying artistic and architectural forms from Istanbul and decorating their provincial palaces with murals portraying the imperial skyline.44
In Istanbul, at the Saadabad pleasure complex, the Grand Vizier Ibrahim used the luxuries and new forms of consumption legitimation of the Tulip Period to discipline and control potential rivals such as these emergent malikalneci's. He was taking the lead in stimulating and trying to direct patterns of consumption to enhance his own prestige and power and to set himself above rivals within official circles and at the court.
Passage of restrictive clothing laws during the 1720s-in the middle of this fabulous display of consumption-shows the conflicting currents in Ottoman societ at the time. Three similar decrees, focusing mainly on gender concerns, date from the late 1720s, when, according to a respected authority on the history of Ottoman clothing, the first laws against immodest public display were promulgated.45 Some "good-for-nothing" women, the decrees stated, had adopted various innovations in their clothing, imitating Christians in the deliberate effort to lead the public astray on Istanbul's streets. Moreover, women allegedly were nearly bankrupting their husbands in order to buy these fashions and, in the process, were hurting the artisans and second-hand-clothes buyers who provided or resold the old styles. To resolve these problems, the decree specified the precise widths and measurements of the items used for the outer coats and headgear. Additionally, the 1727 regulation in thi series of three decrees forbade non-elite men and women from wearing ermine fur.
In focusing on a combination of moral and economic issues and appealing to forces that opposed the new displays at court and the broader social changes tha they were generating, the laws (unsuccessfully) sought to relegitimize a governm shaken by failed foreign wars.47 They also represented the elites' attempts to r late the spread of the new consumption beyond the groups surrounding the grand vizier and the Ottoman court. Consumption competition within elite circles and as legitimation device among privileged persons was one thing, but its percolation downward to others bore risks. The hazards were hardly imaginary. In 1730, a pop lar revolt-the so-called Patrona Halil rebellion-toppled the sultan and destroyed the voluptuary grand vizier and the pleasure palaces around Saadabad.
Even though the grand vizier was dead and the palaces smashed, the genies of political, economic, and social change were out of the bottle, and clothing laws could not put them back in again. Elite Muslims, through their control of the malikane holdings, remained powerful for the rest of the century. Moreover, because many of their holdings were based on trade, they benefitted from the expanding international commerce-with Europe and with India-Iran-that characterized the 18th century. Clothing legislation from the era of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) reflects the long-term changes that were occurring as well as the immediate crises in the soci economic, and political order. More disastrous wars and rebellions, notably in the Egyptian and Serb lands, had led to further territorial losses. Ruinous policies and extortionate taxation to finance those wars had inflicted serious harm on the economy.54 Sharp inflation and currency devaluations, for example, had reduced t content of the main silver coinage by one-half.55 In Selim III's era, there m been a glaring discrepancy between the prosperity displayed by the malikdne and international merchants and the more general impoverishment that stalk man streets.
At a time when his domestic power was very weak and the legitimation gained from foreign ventures nearly nonexistent, Sultan Selim III endeavored to maintain social discipline by demanding modest dress. Soon after ascending the throne, the This content downloaded from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11 Dec 2016 12:14:10 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms sultan disapprovingly noted that his aristocrats (hanedan) and statesmen were displaying themselves publicly in the latest fashion while their retinues strutted around in similarly elaborate dress as a means of announcing their attachment to these great men. Because many officials did not have the requisite incomes, the decree stated, corruption and bribery increased. Further, he condemned the behavior of those tradesmen and workers (esnaf) and other common people (halk) who, seeking to emulate their superiors, had adopted these aristocratic fashions. And so, the sultan formally demanded restoration of the sartorial status quo ante.56 In this way, the state imposed control obliquely, showing itself to be the upholder of public morality and justice. It sought legitimacy with a general public that daily was living with personal impoverishment. While many officials really were living in luxury and ostentatiously displaying their wealth, the sultan's pronouncement aligned the state with the Istanbul street and demanded frugal, modest public behavior.
In Selim III's reign, clothing laws occasionally had an emphasis that, in several respects, seems different from earlier times. In the past, the laws primarily expressed a concern for morality, social discipline, and order, stressing extravagance and waste on the personal level-including the matter of wives bankrupting their husbands.57 As just seen, these themes are repeated in Selim III's laws: for example, the notion that personal extravagance beyond one's means leads to corruption and bribery. But Selim's pronouncements sometimes shift away from disciplinary issues to economic ones, focusing on profligates who were buying foreign goods and harming the domestic production of goods and the treasury. While such economic concerns can be found in earlier Ottoman periods, they seem to appear much more frequently in the reign of Selim.58 Clothing laws took on economic dimensions as the sultan directly appealed for support among Ottoman artisans who made the goods that the monarch himself claimed to wear. The Ottoman artisanal guilds at this time were in disarray; they probably had suffered more than any other group from the new taxes imposed to finance the failed wars of the late 18th century. In his bid for artisans' support, the sultan was addressing a politically potent group, thanks to its ties to the janissaries.60 Thus, the clothing laws' appeal to the economic concerns of artisans also reached out to the janissaries, whose political support and military arms he still needed against foreign enemies.61
Sultan Selim III's clothing laws differed from those of this predecessors in a second way. They did not merely seek to maintain legitimacy but more particularly to (re)concentrate political power around the person of the sultan. His just-quoted statements about the fashionable hanedan and the statesmen, and about those wearing Indian and Iranian cloth, are notable in this regard, for he was directly criticizing ranking members of his own government and contrasting their improper behavior with his own correct demeanor. He pointed out their public over-indulgence and distinguished their disloyal consumption of foreign textiles from his own sartorial support of local producers.
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In sum, the sultan was appealing for broad popular support in his str elite rivals. Even though they defeated the monarch, costing him both life, it seems important to note the role of clothing laws in this rehear more successful centralization reforms of the 19th century.
THE CLOTHING REVOLUTION OF SULTAN MAHMUD II
From the perspective of internal peace, foreign wars Sultan Mahmud II was marked by a series of disaste dismal record of Selim III. A weakened sultanate with an emboldened group of provincial notables, a their autonomy. Somewhat later, only Great Power mad Ali Pasha of Egypt from seizing or overthr goals are still debated), at about the time that Greek dependent state, offering a powerful attraction to m who remained under the sultan's authority. And de ated, the silver content of the piaster falling by a fu
In this setting, Sultan Mahmud II employed drastic a strong monarchy with a new legitimation. He beg for the military, a process that took place in a num ing to one standard account, the sultan was seeking Victorious Muslim Soldiers (Asakir-i Mansure-i Muh connected to the janissaries. He found success in 182 and men came to court wearing the fez, which they the western Mediterranean. The approving sultan m army, ordering the men to wrap a cloth around thei With suitable headgear in place for his navy and a the new regulations for his civil and religious offic his drive to reconstitute the state on a new basis. To sonnel, he ordered his bureaucrats to wear a plain f at large also would adopt the new headgear.64
This 1829 regulation, whose drama actually match janissaries, pushed aside a centuries-old Ottoman provided the crucial and central marker of identity, legislation, the sultan publicly worried that the sym undercut: widespread imitation of official costumes, (seyfiye) and religious classes (ilmiye) of their gran he added, to prevent squandering and extravagance a scribed in painstaking detail the clothing (and some rank. Altogether, he singled out for attention at le civil and religious officials and noted the clothing an would wear.65
At first glance, these stipulations of attire for off sitions appear very similar in form and content to earlier centuries. A revolutionary notion, however, familiar invocation to differentiation by dress, for
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11 Dec 2016 12:14:10 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms civil official at every single rank (except for a handful at the very top) was to wear exactly the same headgear, the fez.66 Thus, all fez-wearing officials, be they kaymakams or clerks, would appear the same. The law in general sought to reorder a regulatory process that had broken down and escaped state control. The state's use of clothing regulations to differentiate and reward as a means of enticing support and service and to demarcate among the many social and economic groups had foundered in the extraordinary messiness and confusion of the 18th century, when so many different groups had clamored for social and political position and when the sultan was merely one of many centers of power. With the 1829 law and its fez provision, Sultan Mahmud attempted to sweep the floor clean and reset the rules for differentiation. He began again at ground zero and sought to reimpose the sultanic state's monopoly over this vital social, political, cultural, and religious sign. The law erased the confused markers of dying elites-the timar and lifetime tax-farm holders, the provincial notability, the pious foundation administrators, and the janissary corps-and set up new ones for the emerging central state bureaucratic cadres that he was creating. But he did not repeat the old practice of distinguishing each group. When he placed the identical fez on all officials and allowed only a very select few, such as the grand vizier, to wear headgear with a distinguishing feature, he laid claim to a new kind of sultanic control. Before him, all officials appeared equal. And to reinforce his monopoly over status making, he began creating medals and decorations that only he could award as a means of establishing rank and hierarchy.67
There is an additional, remarkable aspect to this headgear legislation. It was a leveling device that symbolically restructured the Ottoman state on a completely new footing-one that was no longer religious in its distinctions but nonreligious in its uniformity. For centuries, the empire had been a multireligious entity based on Muslim supremacy; its military and bureaucratic personnel had been drawn (essentially) from the ranks of a Muslim populace that enjoyed a position of general social superiority over non-Muslims. The 1829 law removed the visible distinctions between (most) non-Muslims and Muslims and facilitated the formation of a new elite without the distinctive markings that had long set one community apart from the othe Wearing the fez, all civil officials would not only appear equal before the sultan; they would also look the same to one another. This outward sameness of a religiously undifferentiated bureaucracy betokened the effort of this ruler of a Mu state to remake that state. In using clothing laws to erode distinctions based on r ligion and create a new base for this regime, Mahmud II offered non-Muslims and Muslims a common subjecthood/citizenry.68 More specifically, his action came a the very moment when the success of the rebel Greeks was so gravely challenging his hold on non-Muslim Ottomans. At this crucial moment, he renegotiated Ottoman identity, stripping it of its religious component. In this manner, the law anticipate by a full decade the Tanzimat (1839-76) commitment to the formal equality of all before the law and the entry of non-Muslims into the military and bureaucracy on the same legal basis as Muslims.69
Some Ottoman subjects responded positively and quickly to the law. This narrator may have been partly right in attributing artisans' oppositio fez to conservatism and religious fanaticism.75 Here, I am postulating t lim popular classes were insisting on a difference between themselves and class for religious reasons, because the official class now could and did include nonMuslims, who wore fezes that disguised their religious affiliation. After all, Mahmud's law had been against not only the Muslim elites who contested his power. By eroding the visible distinctions of attire among the religious communities, it also undermined the particular and superior social place of Muslims in general. Hence, it was an issue of popular concern. Demanding distinctive headgear, workers rejected the path toward religious undifferentiation that the sultan was proposing. There is a second, different hypothesis to explain rejection of the plain fez. Here I am conjecturing that the action was an expression of a distinctive workers' culture among both Muslims and non-Muslims. This interpretation fits into a broader picture of state-worker interaction before and after promulgation of the law. In their actions, the workers were spurning Mahmud II's economic policies, which reversed the protectionism of his predecessors, most recently displayed in Sultan Selim III's appeal to artisanal groups and their janissary allies. The janissaries' massacre reduced the political power of workers, and Sultan Mahmud began to dismantle Ottoman protectionism, replacing it with a laissez-faire economy that subsequently evolved at the expense of the once-privileged and protected guilds. In 1831, for example, he attacked the monopolistic privileges of guilds and threatened many workers' livelihoods.76 Then, in 1838, he signed the Anglo-Turkish Convention, an important step on the road to a free-trade economy that sided with merchants involved in international trade (who by this time were mainly non-Muslim or foreign). In this interpretation, the plain fe worn by the Muslim and non-Muslim bureaucrats and by the non-Muslim merchants represented support for the laissez-faire economic policies of the sultan (Figure 3) .
This ments for the vanished janissary battalions. In this environment, artisanal and popular resistance to the clothing legislation was successful, and the sultan backed down. By wearing fezes wrapped in a wide variety of fabrics, workers aimed to differentiate themselves from the Ottoman official classes, international merchants, and other laissez-faire advocates who had so quickly adopted the plain fez.79 They spurned the path of emulation and pursued that of identity solidarity. And as photographs of Ottoman workers make clear (Figures 4 and 5) , many continued to do so for the remainder of the 19th century. These photographs also seem to show that the headgear for Muslims and non-Muslims was the same; their headgear identified them as workers 
CONCLUSION
This examination of Ottoman clothing laws illustrates broader issues such as wars and political instability; t the regime's negotiations with the various contendin and the larger society; the limits on state influence o ing the subsequent evolution of Ottoman society. Historically, clothing laws in Europe, America, and t to create or maintain differences among the social r rately, to give the impression that the state was try social change rendered maintenance of these laws dif they were abandoned outright, and by about 1800 go the business of seeking to dictate attire. Rather than the competing social classes, the Ottoman state in 18 society by creating a uniform, state-centered dress co turned clothing laws on their head. For perhaps the This content downloaded from 212.175.32.131 on Sun, 11 Dec 2016 12:14:10 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms clothing laws to promote homogeneity, uniformity in dress instead of d In at least this respect, the 1829 law stands out as unique in the annals American, and Ottoman clothing laws. After passage of the 1829 law, Ottoman society was demarcated in a the state sought to sweep away the confusion of the past century and re over differentiation. On the one hand, the state penetrated more deepl by eliminating the visible symbols distinguishing the official and nonof its effort to become the ultimate arbiter of status, it created totally n of dress, distinction, and identification. Competing forms of demarcatio ethnicity, or occupation thus became more indistinct than ever before law, the state sought to take control of a reshaping of Ottoman society taking place since the 18th century, as non-Muslims dressed like Musli dinate Muslims dressed like their social superiors. As the state intended middle-strata Muslims and non-Muslims superficially, sartorially, came one another in an unprecedented manner. On the other hand, Ottoman pudiated the spirit and letter of the new law and perpetuated their ow ness in pursuit of their own economic goals and identity. Taking their id the workplace, they rejected the state's alternative. The state thus faile fully the demarcation process. Status markers that resembled signs sep from class emerged to compete with those originating from the state.
The evolution of a post-1829 Ottoman society in which workers deve tained a sense of community among themselves should not be overstate tors continued to weaken the bonds developing among workers as a result work experiences and common opposition to state policies and merchan For example, the foreign origins of many 19th-century enterprises (such utilities, and the Public Debt Administration) meant that hiring policies f recruiting of non-Muslim over Muslim workers. State policies of divide a also corroded workers' sense of common identity. To illustrate the impact of state policies, recall the Turkish and Kurdish porters who were exiled after the janissary massacre in 1826. As has been detailed elsewhere, Sultan Mahmud immediately replaced these banished workers with Armenians from eastern Anatolian villages. In turn, these Armenian laborers were eliminated from the Istanbul workplace in the 1890s, massacred by angry mobs from the lower classes of the capital. Sultan Abdul Hamid II then replaced these dead porters with Kurds, drawn from the same eastern regions.8' In their actions, both sultans were exploiting existing divisions among persons of shared economic status. Their ability to do so obviously meant that religious and ethnic differences sometimes overrode the bonds of worker solidarity.
The example of the porters also illustrates a fundamental confusion in state efforts to redefine Ottoman subjecthood and citizenry. On the one hand, Mahmud's policies and those of his successors demonstrate the move toward a new common identity, with a more powerful state (sometimes led by a strong monarch) demanding the allegiance of uniformly dressed servants and subjects. In this vision, all derived a common identity from their relationship to the state. On the other, the state contin ued-both in Mahmud's reign and later-to play one group off against the other. These actions exacerbated rather than submerged differences and worked against the formation of a state-centered identity.
The confusion in state policies mirrored that in the Ottoman streets and public spaces of the 19th century. By the 1850s, the area of the Grand Champs du Mort/ Tepeba?i in Istanbul had become perhaps its preeminent place of public display. One observer, the French flaneur Theophile Gautier, describes the fancy carriages (sometimes from America) that carried rich, non-Muslim Pera families in an area that also had become the haunt of fashionable Europeans and Muslim gentlemen (Celebis).
These fops and dandies not only followed European fashion but were ahead of it.82 Gautier's description has several points of interest. First, the public spaces of Istanbul long dominated by the Muslim elites-such as the Sweet Waters of Europewere being overtaken by spaces in which non-Muslims and Europeans prevailed.
Second, it offers additional evidence that the state's 1829 policy of redemarcation was only partially succeeding. On the one hand, the fez, frock coat, and pantaloons had become the standard garb of the official and aspiring classes, both Muslim and non-Muslim. But wealthy non-Muslims were distinguishing themselves from their Muslim counterparts through extravagance and the up-to-the-minute fashionability of their attire. Third, the 1829 effort to set a code of (state-centered) modest, simple attire had foundered. Unlike 19th-century Europe and America, where simplicity and refinement of manner overcame magnificence and became the elite code of fashion and behavior, sumptuousness endured as the standard in the Ottoman lands. Fourth, Muslims (the qelebi gentlemen) were using non-Muslims as their models. To add to this confusion, as already noted, many artisans and workers refused to emulate their official and merchant superiors and created or maintained their own distinctive markers.
The state was mired between legitimacies. Long-standing religious distinctions were embroiled in emerging class differentiations that clashed with immature notions of a common subjecthood/citizenry. The Ottoman Empire had no face. 18Claire Sponsler, "Narrating the Social Order: Medieval Clothing Laws," Clio (Spring She prefers the term "clothing laws" to "sumptuary laws" because the purpose of the latter is to curb excess. In this article, I have followed her usage. '9Ibid., 266. 27Hammer, Histoire, V:24-25. Specifically, the "ordinary classes wore either a persha shemle, one carelessly wrapped around the head." I must note that elsewhere in his history, Hammer makes an error on the issue of tobac a subject that I currently am researching. He correctly states that the Kanun-t reaya includ the payment of taxes called resm-i duhdn, but he erroneously describes this tax to be o smoking tobacco ("le droit sur l'usage du tabac a fumer"), VI:271, n. 6. Rather, the duhdn tioned by Hammer is a tax on land use. For example, see, inter alia, Ahmed Akgundtiz, O nameleri (Istanbul, 1990), 11:158, from the era of Bayezid II (1481-1512) 
